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Abstract: The status of international agricultural research as a global public good 
(GPG) has been widely accepted since the Green Revolution of the 1960s and 
1970s. While the term was not used at the time of its creation, the CGIAR system 
that evolved at that time has been described as a ‘prime example of the promise, 
performance and perils of an international approach to providing GPGs’. 
Contemporary literature on international agricultural research as a GPG tends to 
support this view and focuses on how to operationalise the concept. This paper 
adopts a different starting point and questions this conceptulisation of the CGIAR 
and its outputs. It questions the appropriateness of such a ‘neutral’ concept to a 
system born of the imperatives of Cold War geopolitics, and shaped by a history of 
attempts to secure its relevance in a changing world. This paper draws on a multi-
sited, ethnographic study of a research effort highlighted by the CGIAR as an 
exemplar of GPG-oriented research. Behind the ubiquitous language of GPGs, 
‘partnership’ and ‘consensus’, however, new forms of exclusion and restriction are 
emerging within everyday practice; reproducing North-South inequalities and 
undermining the ability of these programmes to respond to the needs of projected 
beneficiaries.  
 
Keywords: international agricultural research, CGIAR, global/international 
public goods, rice science, biofortification 
 
 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of 
Peasant Studies on 13th January 2011, available online: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03066150.2010.538581 
 
 
 
                                               
1 Correct citation: Brooks, S. (2011) ‘Is International Agricultural Research a Global 
Public Good? The Case of Rice Biofortification’, Journal of Peasant Studies, 38 (1) 67 – 
80 
 
2 
 
Introduction 
The status of international agricultural research as a global public good (GPG) has been 
widely accepted since the Green Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. While the precise 
term was not used at the time of its creation, the CGIAR system that evolved at that time 
has been described as a ‘prime example of the promise, performance and perils of an 
international approach to providing GPGs’ (Dalrymple 2008:349). Today, while debates 
about the role and value of GPGs in international development have a higher profile than 
in the past (Secretariat of the International Task Force on Global Public Goods 2006), 
these debates have, according to Dalrymple, overlooked their role in science and 
technology. Citing the CGIAR as exemplar, he echoes calls for increased support for a 
system well placed to generate widespread spillover effects (Dalrymple 2008). Within the 
CGIAR the GPG principle was highlighted by the CGIAR Science Council (2006) during 
an institutional reform process in the early 2000s, in which the system’s ‘comparative 
advantage’ in GPG research was emphasised as the surest way to maximise impact and 
demonstrate its continued relevance. This was to be operationalised, in the first place, 
through the ‘Challenge Program’ (CP) model, a mechanism specifically designed to 
produce a new generation of international public goods to tackle problems of global 
significance through cutting-edge, interdisciplinary, cross-sectoral research (Science 
Council and CGIAR Secretariat 2004).  
 
Much of the literature on international agricultural research as a GPG supports this view 
and focuses on how the system can enhance its implementation of the concept (Sagasti 
and Timmel 2008, Kaul 2008). This paper adopts a different starting point and questions 
this representation of the CGIAR and its outputs in terms of GPGs. In particular, it 
questions the appropriateness and explanatory power of such a ‘neutral’ concept when 
applied to a system born of the imperatives of Cold War geopolitics (Perkins, 1997) and 
whose subsequent trajectory has been shaped by successive attempts to transform the 
CGIAR to secure its relevance in a changing world (cf. Oasa 1997). The reforms of the 
early 2000s were just one chapter in this broader history. It was at this time that the 
newly established Science Council articulated GPG research as the raison d’etre of the 
CGIAR and the Challenge Program as a model for its implementation (CGIAR Science 
Council 2006). This paper uses draws on empirical material from an in depth study of 
rice biofortification research efforts by the CGIAR, with a focus on HarvestPlus, one of 
the four pilot Challenge Programs launched during this period (Brooks 2010).  
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The term ‘biofortification’ refers to technologies for enhancing, through biological 
processes such as plant breeding and transgenic techniques, the micronutrient content 
of staple crops. Biofortified crop varieties have been heralded as the new miracle seeds, 
able to address the problem of micronutrient malnutrition, even in remote rural areas that 
are hard to reach with pharmaceutical interventions such as supplementation or 
industrial food fortification (HarvestPlus 2004a). This paper focuses on developments 
around one crop, rice, arguably the world’s most important crop (FAO 2003). By 
exploring dynamics of science policy processes in rice biofortification it highlights 
aspects of GPG-oriented research in practice that are missed by conventional GPG 
analyses. In particular, it highlights ways in which emerging interdisciplinary and inter-
institutional hierarchies within global research ‘partnerships’ are undermining the 
realisation of the GPG ‘ideal’.  
 
This paper is structured as follows: It begins by exploring how and why the notion of 
international agricultural research as a GPG has been highlighted in recent years. It then 
summarises developments in rice biofortification within the CGIAR, between 1995 and 
2005, drawing attention to a convergence between assumptions embedded in an 
institution shaped by the imperatives of the Green Revolution and a revived interest, 
today, in generic silver bullet solutions to complex global problems. Both sets of 
dynamics reinforce the ‘lock in’ to genetics-led strategies, perceived as uniquely able to 
deliver widespread spillover effects (cf. Hogg, 2000) . Subsequent sections highlight the 
effects of mutually reinforcing institutional and interdisciplinary biases on a programme 
of research that constructs beneficiaries in its own image, rather than seek to address to 
the diverse needs of particular groups. In light of this analysis, the concluding section 
returns to the question of GPG  research, arguing that Michel Callon’s (1994) 
conceptualisation of science as a public good provides the basis for a more nuanced 
analysis and critique of the more subtle ways in which public research is being 
undermined, but may yet be revived. 
 
Global public goods research and the CGIAR 
The notion of international agricultural research outputs as GPGs was implicit in the 
vision and design of the Green Revolution; and that of the early ‘definitive centres’ for 
crop research such as the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) and the Centre for 
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Improvement of Wheat and Maize (CIMMYT) that provided the foundation for what 
would later become the CGIAR network of International Agricultural Research Centres 
(IARCs). . While the terminology of international or global public goods was not used at 
the time, the Green Revolution, and the international infrastructure that evolved to 
support it, was founded on a set of core assumptions about the scale-neutrality of the 
outputs of genetics-led crop research (Anderson et al. 1991). These assumptions have 
weathered decades of debates, both without and outside the CGIAR, about the relative 
merits of methodologies positioned along a continuum from generic to more site-specific 
approaches (cf. Biggs and Clay 1981). Today, an explicit focus on GPG-oriented 
research as key to achieving ‘impact at scale’ has refocused attention and resources 
towards the generic end of the spectrum, and specifically to large scale plant breeding 
programmes, in the belief that they ‘generally rank well in terms of spillovers’ in 
comparison with more site specific approaches (Dalrymple 2008:359). 
 
It is important to recognise the particular geopolitical and political-economic context 
within which the CGIAR system emerged and took shape. It was at the height of the 
Cold War that agricultural development assistance came to be seen as an essential 
element of US foreign policy (Perkins 1997). This new focus integrated two sets of ideas 
about the advancement of US national interests in the Cold War era. The first was the 
imperative to contain communism in Asia. Investments in the modernisation of 
agriculture, it was argued, would generate food surpluses to feed growing urban 
populations and prevent unrest.  Less explicit was ‘a concern of US business interests, 
articulated through private foundations such as the Rockefeller and Ford foundations to 
create the conditions for the future expansion of trade and investment, which required 
the integration of developing-country agriculture into capitalist national economies’ 
(Brooks 2010: 16). 
 
Similarly, a combination of factors has contributed to the CGIAR’s apparent return to its 
roots today. Firstly, the focus on GPG-oriented research can be seen as a response to 
an international development agenda now dominated by a single global framework: the 
millennium development goals (MDGs). Today, development success is judged 
according to a metric that measures progress towards a set of universal global targets, 
in absolute, aggregate terms, thus avoiding problematic questions of inequality and 
exclusion (Saith 2006). Secondly, this shift to goal-oriented development has been 
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coupled with a renewed emphasis on a central role of science, technology and 
innovation in development efforts; encouraged by the arrival on the scene of a new 
generation of private philanthropists (or Philanthro-capitalists (Edwards, 2008)),led by 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF), whose favoured strategy marries an 
enduring faith in science-based solutions with a ‘business-minded’ approach to 
philanthropic giving. It is in this context that a research agenda based on a series of 
generic, ‘silver bullet’ solutions with associated claims to built-in scalability has found 
substantial donor support (Brooks et al. 2009). 
 
While emphasising the system’s public goods research mandate those governing these 
new directions for the CGIAR have had to incorporate a new dimension of complexity 
into their definition of GPG research. A recent resurgence of donor interest in agricultural 
research and development has followed two decades of underinvestment in the sector, 
and in the public institutions - international and, in particular, national - that might 
otherwise have been central to this renewed effort. This decline in public research 
capacity has been accompanied by an expansion of the role of the transnational private 
sector, particularly in life sciences research. Today, many of the tools required for the 
kind of ‘cutting edge research’ to which CGIAR now aspires are the intellectual property 
of transnational corporations. In 2005, report by the Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI) declared ’a broad consensus that [public private] partnership can create valuable 
synergies through knowledge sharing, joint learning, scale economies, resource pooling 
and risk sharing’ (IFPRI 2005:4). Notably, the Challenge Program mechanism, which 
allows for ‘large, multi-stakeholder partnerships focused on major global issues’ was 
highlighted as an institutional model that would be more conducive to collaboration with 
the transnational private sector (IFPRI 2005:6). 
 
How have these potential conflicts of interest been reconciled within a renewed GPG 
research agenda within the CGIAR? At the time it was piloted, the Challenge Program 
model, defined as follows, was expected to point the way: “A time-bound, independently 
governed program of high impact research that targets the CGIAR goals in relation to 
complex issues of overwhelming global and/or regional significance, and requires 
partnerships between a wide range of institutions in order to deliver its products” 
(Science Council and CGIAR Secretariat 2004:4, original emphasis). In this context, 
CGIAR centres would play a ‘brokering’ role in global, heterogeneous networks 
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comprising a wide range of public and private institutions (Rijsberman 2002:3); an 
‘honest broker’: steering these complex networks in directions consistent with a public 
goods research mandate (Brooks 2010:4).  
 
The remaining sections of this paper analyse the case of international rice biofortification 
research, in the CGIAR and its partners, as an exemplar of an evolving model for global 
‘public goods’ science that remains fraught with challenges and contradictions. As such, 
it goes beyond more obvious questions of public versus private sector ownership and 
control to explore the effects of a fundamental accountability deficit, inherent in the 
Challenge Program design as a ‘virtual centre’2, on the conduct of research and practice 
of development by and within these increasingly complex networks. The biofortification 
case is of particular interest given its recognition as the most successful Challenge 
Program (Science Council and CGIAR Secretariat 2004), and subsequently identified as 
one of fourteen ‘best bets’ for ‘scaling up’ in the coming years (von Braun et al. 2008). 
Furthermore, the case of rice biofortification research in the CGIAR is particularly 
illuminating due to its intersection with a parallel BMGF-funded biofortification ‘Grand 
Challenge’3, launched in the same year as HarvestPlus, and the much older Golden Rice 
project, whose role as a pioneering example of a public-private partnership forged in the 
pursuit of humanitarian goals has been contested in recent years (Potrykus 2001). 
 
Rice biofortification: a brief history (1995-2005) 
Biofortification research had been an ongoing, if somewhat marginal activity within the 
CGIAR since CIMMYT scientists first began working on ‘Quality Protein Maize’ (QPM) or 
in the early 1970s (Bouis 1995). However, difficulties arose in the breeding research (the 
yields of early high lysine varieties were disappointing) and from the singular emphasis 
on protein (after a re-evaluation of international nutrition priorities) which led CGIAR 
scientists to conclude that the programme had been ‘a major misallocation of resources’ 
(Bouis, 1995a, p5). Nevertherless, the idea of biofortification – this time for 
micronutrients – resurfaced during the early 1990s following a series of international 
conferences, notably the ‘Ending Hidden Hunger’ conference in Ottawa in 1991, which 
concentrated the efforts of the international nutrition community towards micronutrient 
deficiency as a global problem (dela Cuadra 2000). A small network of scientists from 
                                               
2
 Interview, HarvestPlus Advisory Board member, 18
th
 September 2007. 
3
http://www.grandchallenges.org/IMPROVENUTRITION/CHALLENGES/NUTRIENTRICHPLANTS/Pages/Ri
ce.aspx (11th May 2010). 
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within and outside the CGIAR began to form around the potential of breeding 
micronutrient-dense staple crop varieties4. Initially drawing on concepts and methods 
from ‘food systems’ research (Combs et al. 1996), these scientists envisaged a ‘new 
paradigm’ for agricultural research (Welch and Graham 1999) in which agriculture would 
be mobilised as ‘an instrument for human health’ (Graham 2002).  
 
Rice biofortification research within the CGIAR during the 1990s and early 2000s was 
concentrated in two major initiatives: a regional iron rice research initiative coordinated 
by IRRI and involving national partners in South and Southeast Asia and the high 
provitamin A ‘Golden Rice’ project led by scientists from ETH, Zurich and Freiburg 
University. The iron rice initiative was initially supported by the CGIAR micronutrients 
project (1994-9) (Bouis et al. 1999), a modest, IFPRI-led initiative, sustained largely by 
the commitment of its coordinator and chief advocate, Howarth Bouis and later absorbed 
into a regional programme supported by the Asian Development Bank (ADB)5. Also in 
the early 1990s, a group of scientists from ETH, Zurich and Freiburg University, 
Germany secured funds from the Rockefeller Foundation6 for a project which aimed to 
produce rice with elevated levels of provitamin A. Unlike trace elements such as iron and 
zinc, which are taken up by rice and other crop plans and therefore found, to a greater or 
lesser degree in the grain, vitamin A (in its precursor carotenoid forms), while present in 
many other crops, is largely absent from rice. So, while iron rice research at IRRI 
followed a conventional plant breeding route, the ‘Golden Rice’ project, as it became 
known, would chart a new course in transgenic rice research. In 1999, to the surprise of 
their donors and even the scientists themselves, they announced their achievement; a 
yellow-coloured rice strain with provitamin A in the endosperm (Ye et al. 2000).  
 
Since that time, the role of ‘Golden Rice’ as the iconic science-policy controversy of the 
decade, routinely summoned by both sides in debates ‘for and against’ GM crops, has 
been extensively documented (Potrykus 2001; Nash 2001; Jasanoff 2005; BIOTHAI 
(Thailand) et al. 2001; Taverne 2007). These debates intensified with a transfer of 
ownership of the Golden Rice materials and technologies from the public institutions that 
had conducted the research, to the corporate sector, in this case the Syngenta 
                                               
4
 Interview, Harvest Plus, 27th January 2006 
5
 Improving Nutrition of Poor Women in Asia: Counterpart Project: 5945 - REG: Rice Breeding to Reduce 
Anaemia in Asia (2001-3). www.adb.org/documents/prf/nutrition.asp (10th November 2005). 
6
 The Golden Rice research was funded by Rockefeller Foundation under the International Rice 
Biotechnology Programme (IRBP). 
8 
 
Company, justified as necessary in order to negotiate an unforeseen maze of intellectual 
property restrictions that threatened to block further progress (Potrykus 2001). 
Nevertheless, through an innovative series of institutional manoeuvres, the status of 
Golden Rice as a global public good was restored by means of a ‘Humanitarian License’ 
which would, under the guidance of a ‘Humanitarian Board’, allow public research 
institutions in developing countries free access to the proprietary technologies under 
certain conditions (Potrykus 2001; Toeniessen 2000). In 2001, the Golden Rice 
materials were finally transferred to IRRI, and the less glamorous task of back-crossing 
these materials into local Indica varieties began (IRRI et al. 2001).  
 
These two early rice biofortification projects, IRRI-coordinated iron rice research and the 
Golden Rice project, have influenced the more recent, globalised programmes in 
markedly different ways. Both projects began with modest expectations of success and 
were open and exploratory in nature. In the case of iron rice research, plant breeders 
have often acknowledged the ‘serendipitous’ nature of the discovery, in the course of a 
rice breeding programme for marginal environments, of materials that seemed to fit the 
bill for the new biofortification project (Gregorio et al. 2000). Similarly, for the Golden 
Rice team their first breakthrough clearly same as a surprise (Potrykus 2001). Secondly, 
both projects have been credited with providing ‘proof of concept’ for the broader 
biofortification enterprise in some way. While a well-publicised ‘feeding trial’ in the 
Philippines provided ‘proof of concept’ that biofortified rice could produce a ‘biologically 
significant effect’7 on bodily iron stores in humans (Haas et al. 2005), the Golden Rice 
transformation proved it was possible to genetically engineer a beta-carotene 
biosynthetic pathway into rice endosperm (Beyer et al. 2002).  
 
In 2003 the CGIAR launched a HarvestPlus (HarvestPlus 2004a), an ambitious global 
programme of biofortification research, and one of four pilot ‘Challenge Programmes’ 
under an institutional reform process taking place within the CGIAR at that time (Science 
Council 2006). Attention was again drawn to the ‘new paradigm’ that biofortification 
research represented. By this time, however, the food systems frame had been largely 
abandoned in favour of a more reductionist vision. HarvestPlus was to be a highly 
centralised operation which would set targets for generic, scalable, ‘gold standard’8 
                                               
7
 Interview, University of the Philippines, 21
st
 June 2006. 
8
 Interview, Harvest Plus, 17
th
 January 2006. 
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technologies (CIAT and IFPRI 2002). While emphasising interdisciplinary collaboration, 
particularly with nutritionists, this was, first and foremost, a crop improvement 
programme which in which plant breeders retained their position at the apex of an 
evolving interdisciplinary hierarchy9. Later that year the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation (BMGF), the largest donor of HarvestPlus, issued their own biofortification 
‘Grand Challenge’, providing grants to four transgenic biofortification research projects. 
These included the ProVitaMinRice Consortium (PVMRC), an ambitious programme 
which would build on the Golden Rice project outputs and institutional framework to 
develop rice fortified with multiple nutrients10 (Gates Foundation 2005). 
 
Brokers or gatekeepers? Emerging hierarchies in research partnerships 
The structure of programmes such as HarvestPlus and the PVMRC reflect the 
complexity of the problems they set out to address and the need, therefore, to engage in 
partnerships with institutions representing complementary areas of expertise. In this 
case, CGIAR centres were to exchange their traditional ‘centre of excellence’ status 
(Chataway et al. 2007) for a new role of ‘broker’ within complex, heterogeneous 
research networks (Rijsberman 2002). As discussed in the opening section, the 
Challenge Program model was designed with the needs of future ‘strategic partnerships’ 
with the transnational private sector in mind. In particular, ‘longstanding principles of 
decentralisation and centre autonomy’ within the CGIAR presented a barrier to more 
intense engagement with the private sector (IFPRI 2005:6). The underlying argument 
seems to have been that these new arrangements would provide a framework within 
which the CGIAR could sustain its identity as a source of public goods research, while 
actively pursuing public-private partnerships of various kinds.  
 
Institutional innovations within the Golden Rice project have been highly influential in this 
respect. In the polarised debates surrounding Golden Rice these have been couched in 
terms of corporate control and manipulation (Nash 2001; BIOTHAI (Thailand) et al. 
2001); an oversimplified interpretation that has clearly exasperated the central actors 
(Potrykus 2001). In between these entrenched positions, however, significant, if more 
subtle restrictive practices are being allowed to emerge and redefine ‘business as usual’ 
                                               
9
 Interviews, nutritionists, 21
st
 January, 2
nd
 February and 28
th
 March, 2006. 
10
 http://www.grandchallenges.org/ImproveNutrition/Challenges/NutrientRichPlants/Pages/default.aspx (21st 
May 2009), www.goldenrice.org/Content2-How/how10_PVMRC.html (9th June 2007). 
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in international biofortification research. It is worthwhile at this point, therefore, to retrace 
some of the events taking place at the time these institutions were in formation. 
 
When the Golden Rice inventors, Ingo Potrykus and Peter Beyer announced their 
breakthrough, they discovered a number of unforeseen private intellectual and technical 
property restrictions that threatened to block further progress. While a ‘freedom to 
operate’ review (Kryder et al. 2000) conducted by ISAAA for the project’s donor, the 
Rockefeller Foundation, identified a range of options, retrospective accounts of 
developments taking place at the time highlight only one – a ‘humanitarian use’ option 
(Potrykus 2001). Under these arrangements, the Golden Rice technologies would be 
handed over to a private company, Zeneca (now Syngenta), which would license it back 
to the inventors under the terms of a ‘humanitarian license’. This would allow public 
research institutions in developing countries to have access to and – crucially for IRRI 
and its NARS partners – conduct adaptive research and make Golden Rice available to 
farmers with an annual income below $10,00011.  
 
Two complementary institutional bodies were established: A ‘Humanitarian Board’, 
initially composed of the ‘fathers of Golden Rice’, Potrykus, Beyer, Adrian Dubock of 
Syngenta and Gary Toenniessen of the Rockefeller Foundation (now extended to twelve 
members including donors, scientists and the director of HarvestPlus12) would oversee 
the interpretation and implementation of the humanitarian license. A Golden Rice 
Network (GRN) would act as ‘technology holder’ and distribute the technologies and 
materials to applicants once such transfers had been approved by the Humanitarian 
Board13. While established as an independent structure, the GRN nevertheless included 
several of IRRI’s traditional NARS partners. However IRRI’s prescribed role as network 
‘hub’ highlights more restrictive, top-down modus operandi than in the past in which 
vertical rather than lateral relations are emphasised: 
…whatever materials are available at IRRI are accessed for adaptive research by 
the different countries, and there is still no cross country relationship … it’s a hub, 
and each spoke independently relating to IRRI. Vietnam will relate to IRRI, India 
will relate to IRRI, Philippines will relate to IRRI, Bangladesh will relate to IRRI. 
But there is no relationship between Vietnam and India, Philippines and India.14 
                                               
11
 Interview, IRRI, 24
th
 May 2006. 
12
 For current membership of the Humanitarian Board see:  http://www.goldenrice.org/Content1-
Who/who1_humbo.html (24th May 2009). 
13
 http://www.goldenrice.org/index.html (24th May 2009). 
14
 Interview, IRRI, 5
th
 December 2006. 
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The impact of these shifting relations has been far reaching, in the context of the 
increasingly porous boundaries between the Golden Rice, PVMRC and HarvestPlus 
programmes. Now described as ‘an external advisory board’15 the Humanitarian Board, 
originally formed for a specific purpose, to oversee the transfer and ‘humanitarian use’ of 
proprietary knowledge and materials has, over time, grown in size and broadened its 
mandate, first over the Golden Rice project, and now the PVMRC. Meanwhile, the 
structure and timing of meetings, which now link HarvestPlus with Golden Rice and the 
PVMRC, are indicative of continued mission creep. In practice, the networks supporting 
these projects are interwoven, with back-to-back meetings an inevitable logistical 
outcome, scheduled according to emerging hierarchies and overseen by an increasingly 
omnipresent Humanitarian Board, as the following account illustrates: 
Both HarvestPlus and the [PVMR] Consortium are governed by the Humanitarian 
Board in terms of research directions. During Consortium meetings and 
HarvestPlus meetings the Humanitarian Board is there as an R&D board. [These 
meetings are conducted] back-to-back: the HarvestPlus main meeting, then the 
Humanitarian Board meeting, then the Humanitarian Board meets each 
[Consortium member] at a time… We were advised what to present to 
them…then we were asked to leave…so they can discuss.16  
 
Official HarvestPlus discourse highlights collaboration between complementary 
institutions and disciplines, with CGIAR centres uniquely placed to act as knowedge 
brokers. This account, however, emphasises that it is vertical, rather than lateral 
relations that characterise ‘business as usual’ within these research ‘partnerships’. 
Furthermore, as the next section illustrates, interdisciplinary relations in practice are 
dominated by established knowledge hierarchies favouring plant genetics and neo-
classical economics. In this case, the nodal position of IRRI in linking upstream and with 
downstream actors; and ‘new’ disciplines such as human nutrition with the ‘classic 
cluster’ of crop sciences (Anderson et al. 1991), allows the role of broker to be 
transformed into that of gatekeeper. Meanwhile, national scientists find themselves 
increasingly marginalised, despite the new influx of funds. As one observer noted: 
The proportion of HarvestPlus funding going to national institutes is miniscule. 
HarvestPlus is not developing the NARS to do the work. That’s the challenge of 
interdisciplinary work … CG mentality is “we are the centres of excellence”17  
 
                                               
15
 www.goldenrice.org/Content2-How/how10_PVMRC.html (9th June 2007). 
16
 Interview, NARS Scientist, 16
th
 January 2007. 
17
 Interview, nutritionist, 28
th
 March 2006 (original emphasis). 
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Has the CGIAR come full circle, with its centres returning to their traditional ‘centre of 
excellence’ role? If so, this would confirm concerns that centre directors might ‘block 
change by trying to use the CPs to raise new resources while holding onto old mandates 
and activities' (Eicher and Rukuni 2003:24). In practice, however, these dynamics are 
part of a more complex story, in which shifting institutional and programme boundaries 
are allowing more room for manoeuvre for some actors than for others. What is clear, 
however, is that intensified upstream scientific and institutional complexity and ambiguity 
is drawing attention further away from downstream realities in all their complexity and 
diversity. These dynamics are compounded and obscured by the selective use of 
disciplinary lenses, in ways that are explored in the next section. 
 
The view from upstream: constructing ‘use’, ‘demand’ and ‘impact’ 
This recasting of the ‘new paradigm’ that biofortification represented, from a systemic to 
a reductive frame, reflected global shifts that had been taking place at that time. As 
discussed in the opening section, despite its many shortcomings the MDG framework 
has become entrenched as the single overarching framework for the evaluation and 
justification of international development initiatives of all kinds (Saith 2006). With 
reference to this framework, improved nutrition has been singled out as a key input to 
ensure the achievements of global development targets (Jeffrey Sachs, in SCN 2004b), 
intensifying trends towards what has been called ‘goal-oriented nutrition’ (Gillespie et al. 
2004). Similarly, the philosophy of the BMGF (and other ‘philanthrocapitalists’ (Edwards 
2008)) emphasises the power of breakthrough science to solve intractable global 
problems. In this case, an inbuilt predisposition towards reductionism within the CGIAR 
has been reinforced by broader trends towards reductive, generic, centralised 
approaches to international nutrition and development. This was reinforced in 2004 
when an ‘expert panel’ of influential economists produced the ‘Copenhagen Consensus’, 
which ranked a series of projects according to their cost-effectiveness on a global scale. 
‘Providing micronutrients’ was ranked second only to ‘control of HIV/AIDS’.18  
 
The disproportionate influence of a group of neo-classical economists on the level of 
global attention paid to nutrition is telling. Similarly, an economistic vision has shaped a 
particular approach to impact assessment and ‘reaching end users’ within biofortification 
initiatives.  However, the sophistication of these economic analyses obscures their 
                                               
18
 www.copenhagenconsensus.com (18
th
 March 2008). 
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reliance on simple causal pathways linking induced changes in ‘consumer choice’ with 
positive health outcomes and economic impacts (Zimmerman and Qaim 2004; Stein et 
al. 2005), using the ‘standard’ epidemiological unit of the disability adjusted life year 
(Stein et al. 2005:8). Beneficiaries - and their needs - are constructed around an 
imagined future product; as passive ‘populations at risk’19 from malnutrition-related 
disease, or as aggregates of individual consumers who might be induced to make more 
‘rational’ choices about which crop varieties to plant or consume. In this case, the 
Challenge Program functions as a ‘centre of calculation’ (Latour 1987), simplifying and 
streamlining diverse manifestations of ‘use’, demand’ and ‘impact’ and crafting them into 
a rationale for products already in the pipeline. These constructions provide reassurance 
to upstream actors about the soundness of decisions already made, as well to donors 
attracted by the impact projections and high absorption capacity of these large research 
consortia. At the same time, they divert attention away from understanding the diversity 
of ecological, social and cultural conditions with which biofortified varieties will interact 
and, ultimately succeed or fail - even though the pitfalls of such an approach were spelt 
out in the early days of the CGIAR micronutrients project: 
[T]he target population is not homogenous so one remedy is unlikely to serve all. 
To intervene efficiently and effectively requires knowing fairly precisely what a 
population lacks and why. That knowledge is no less necessary for selecting 
crop-modification strategies than for formulating policy (Calloway 1995:21). 
 
This effective separation of impact from context has particular implications for 
biofortification research, which within today’s globalised programmes recombines the 
reductive frames of two hegemonic disciplines - plant genetics and neo-classical 
economics – marginalising contributions from other social and natural sciences. Both 
disciplinary perspectives incorporate assumptions of scale neutrality which enable them 
to construct problems, solutions and beneficiaries in a particular way – one that is 
equally attractive both to science-policy strategists making the case for agricultural 
research outputs as GPGs and donors in search of simple, ‘silver bullet’ solutions. The 
calls for greater attention to site specificity and context responsiveness made both by 
nutritionists such as Calloway as well as agronomists within the CGIAR and NARS20 are 
a poor match for these claims for ‘impact at scale’ in an era of GPG-oriented research. 
                                               
19
The CGIAR Biofortification Challenge Programme: Shared Solutions to Global Problems, World Bank 
Human Development Network Briefing, 13
th
 March 2003 
www.ifpri.org/events/seminars/2003/20030313_briefing.htm (January 2004). 
20
 Interviews, IRRI and PhilRice, June 2007. 
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The visualisation of biofortification as a public health intervention comparable to water 
fluoridation is a case in point: 
The [required nutrients] will get into the food system much like we put fluoride in 
the water system. It will be invisible, but it will be there to increase intakes’.21 
 
This framing locates biofortification in the ‘best shot’ category of GPG, ‘where the largest 
contribution solely determines the good’s overall level, and lesser action is redundant’ 
(Sandler 2006:152). It is clear, however, that the ‘best shots may have much to learn 
from the ‘lesser actions’. However, this would require interdisciplinary engagement in 
which scale assumptions embedded in particular disciplines are acknowledged and 
debated in relation to their relevance to the problem at hand. Literature that cites 
biofortification research within the CGIAR as a GPG is notably silent on this issue 
(Dalrymple 2008:364). This is not surprising, since public goods frameworks do not take 
account of the kind of cross-scale dynamics that mediate the impact of global 
programmes such as biofortification research on people in diverse environments. 
 
Conclusion: science, diversity and the public good 
Is international agricultural research a global public good; and can this claim be 
sustained in an era of public private partnerships? The case of biofortification presented 
here suggests that perhaps this is the wrong question. This paper has highlighted 
processes of simplification and convergence inherent in maintaining complex globalised 
research networks which are expected to generate ‘cutting edge research’ as well as 
demonstrate attributable impact within the constraints of a ‘time bound’ programme. 
These expectations and pressures undermine the potential of science as a public good 
as conceptualised by Callon (1994). According to Callon, science is a public good if and 
when it is a source of diversity, irrespective of the institutional location of the actors 
involved. Conversely, ‘private science’ is science that leads to commodification and ‘lock 
in’: 
Science is a public good when it can make a new set of entities proliferate and 
reconfigure the existing states of the world. Private science is the science that 
firms up these worlds, makes them habitable. That is why public and private 
science are complementary despite being distinct: each draws on the other. This 
definition is independent of the identity of the actors involved (Callon 1994:23). 
 
                                               
21
 http://www.worldfoodprize.org/assets/symposium/2005/transcripts/Bouis.pdf (9th January 2009). 
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At present, biofortification research as practiced within global research networks 
discussed in this paper is not benefitting from such complementarity. Rather, both public 
and private actors are increasingly locked into a mode of operation whose outputs 
exemplify what Callon calls ‘private science’. But what is the nature of the world that this 
science ‘firms up’ and makes ‘habitable’?  As Fernandez (2007) has highlighted, such 
questions about the ‘capital in agriculture’ are rarely posed, even by noted critics of the 
increasingly narrow disciplinary base of the CGIAR. As discussed in the previous 
section, a hegemony of disciplines that share largely unexamined assumptions about the 
scale neutrality and universality of the knowledge and artifacts they generate 
compounds a lack of accountability towards national institutions and ‘partners’. Of 
particular concern is the lack of engagement with health ministries in target countries22 
regarding what is ultimately ‘a health intervention, using food as an intervention to 
administer extra nutrients’.23 Instead, the attention of these global actors is focussed 
upstream; and on maintaining the alliances necessary to secure continued financial and 
institutional support.  
 
A notable feature of the language used by proponents of biofortification as a global 
project is the proliferation of ‘boundary terms’ (Gieryn 1999) such as ‘new paradigm’, 
‘gold standard’ and ‘proof of concept’. The normalisation of such terms within a scientific 
research context has been rapid and apparently unproblematic, perhaps due the 
CGIAR’s unusual position as a ‘mission oriented’ research institution (Anderson et al. 
1999). The ubiquity of the term ‘proof of concept’ across a range of peer-reviewed, 
scientific articles on biofortification is a case in point (for example see Beyer et al. 2002: 
510s, Toenniessen 2002: 2946S). Such terms perform an inherently political function: a 
function obscured by their ostensibly ‘technical’ character. In particular, their 
employment serves to downplay the uncertainties and ambiguities that inevitably emerge 
from the conflicting interests, agendas and disciplinary framing assumptions that lurk 
behind the ‘consensus’ presented by globalised research networks. 
 
With ‘scaling up biofortification’ written into CGIAR plans for the coming years (von 
Braun et al. 2008); these dynamics can be expected to intensify. Given the inbuilt 
tendencies and external pressures towards reductionism described in this paper, the 
                                               
22
 Interview, nutritionist, 26
th
 March 2006. 
23
 Interview, WHO, 14
th
 March 2006. 
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question is how to create and protect spaces for a ‘public goods’ science which engages 
with social, cultural and agro-ecological diversity. Recent reflections on the social and 
political dynamics of the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge Science 
and Technology for Development (IAASTD) may provide lessons in this regard (Feldman 
et al. 2010, Scoones 2010); in particular, the backdrop provided by the ‘antagonistic 
politics’ (Scoones 2010: 568) of competing interests and associated ‘epistemic 
communities’ (Haas 1992) that were unlikely to reach a meaningful ‘consensus’. 
Meanwhile, the uncritical acceptance of biofortification as an exemplar of global public 
goods research as a way forward for the CGIAR suggests that a far more searching 
examination of the role and responsibility of the system vis a vis science for the public 
good has yet to take place. 
 
References 
Anderson, R.S., E. Levy, and B.M. Morrison. 1991. Rice Science and Development 
Politics: Research Strategies and IRRI’s Technologies Confront Asian Diversity 
(1950-1980). Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Beyer, P., S. Al-Babili, X. Ye, P. Lucca, P. Schaub, R. Welsch, and I. Potrykus. 2002. 
Golden Rice: Introducing the beta-carotene Biosynthesis Pathway into Rice 
Endosperm by genetic Engineering to Defeat Vitamin A Deficiency. Journal of 
Nutrition Symposium: Plant Breeding: A New Tool for Fighting Micronutrient 
Malnutrition:506s-510s. 
Biggs, S.D., and E.J. Clay. 1981. Sources of Innovation in Agricultural Technology. 
World Development 9 (4):321-336. 
BIOTHAI (Thailand), CEDAC (Cambodia, DRCSC (India), GRAIN, MASIPAG 
(Philippines), PAN-Indonesia, and UBINIG (Bangladesh). 2001. Grains of 
Delusion: Golden Rice Seen from the Ground. Los Banos, Philippines: 
MASIPAG. 
Bouis, H. 1995. F.A.S. Public Interest Report: Breeding for nutrition. Journal of the 
Federation of American Scientists:1, 8-16. 
Bouis, H.E., R.D. Graham, and R.M. Welch. 1999. The CGIAR Micronutrients Project: 
Justification, History, Objectives and Summary of Findings. Paper read at 
Improving Human Nutrition through Agriculture: The Role of International 
Agricultural Research, at IRRI, Los Banos, Philippines. 
17 
 
Brooks, S. 2010. Rice Biofortification: Lessons for Global Science and Development. 
London, UK: Earthscan. 
Brooks, S., M. Leach, H. Lucas, and E. Millstone. 2009. Silver Bullets, Grand Challenges 
and the New Philanthropy, STEPS Working Paper 24. Brighton: STEPS Centre. 
Callon, M. 1994. Is Science a Public Good? Science, Technology, & Human Values 19 
(4):395-424. 
Calloway, D.H. 1995. Human Nutrition: Food and Micronutrient Relationships. In 
Working Papers on Agricultural Strategies for Micronutrients, No1, edited by H. 
E. Bouis. Washington DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. 
Chataway, J., J. Smith, and D. Wield. 2007. Shaping scientific excellence in agricultural 
research. International Journal of Biotechnology 9 (2):172-187. 
CIAT, and IFPRI. 2002. Biofortified Crops for Improved Human Nutrition: A Challenge 
Programme Proposal presented by CIAT and IFPRI to the CGIAR Science 
Council. Washington DC and Cali: International Centre for Tropical Agriculture 
and International Food Policy Research Institute. 
Combs, G.F., R.M. Welch, J.M. Duxbury, N.T. Uphoff, and M.C. Nesheim. 1996. Food-
Based Approaches to Preventing Micronutrient Malnutrition: An International 
Research Agenda. Ithaca, NY: Cornell International Institute for Food, Agriculture 
and Development (CIIFAD), Cornell University. 
Dalrymple, D.G. 2008. International Agricultural Research as a Global Public Good: 
Concepts, the CGIAR experience, and policy issues. Journal of International 
Development 20:347-379. 
dela Cuadra, A.C. 2000. The Philippine micronutrient supplementation programme. Food 
and Nutrition Bulletin 21 (4):512-514. 
Edwards, M. 2008. Just Another Emperor? The Myths and Realities of 
Philanthrocapitalism: Demos and The Young Foundation. 
Eicher, C.K., and M. Rukuni. 2003. Thematic Working Paper: The CGIAR in Africa: Past 
Present and Future. In The CGIAR at 31: An Independent Meta-evaluation of the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, edited by World Bank 
Operations Evaluation Department. Washington DC: World Bank. 
FAO. 2003. The International Year of Rice 2004: Concept Paper. Rome: International 
Year of Rice Secrerariat, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations. 
18 
 
Feldman, S., Biggs, S., & Raina, R., 2010. A Messy Confrontation of a Crisis in 
Agricultural Science. Economic & Political Weekly, Vol XLV, 3. pp. 66-71. 
Fernandez, J.L. 2007. Culture in Agriculture versus Capital in Agriculture: A Response to 
the Crisis of Social Science Research in CGIAR, Culture and Agriculture, Vol. 29, 
No. 1, pp 6-24. 
Gates Foundation. 2005. The Face of Change: 22 Stories from 2005. Annual Report. 
Seattle: Gates Foundation. 
Gieryn, T. F. (1999) Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Gillespie, S., M. McLachlan, and R. Shrimpton. 2004. Combating Nutrition: Time to Act. 
Washington DC: World Bank. 
Graham, R. D. . 2002. A Proposal for IRRI to Establish a Grain Quality and Nutrition 
Research Centre. In Discussion Paper No. 44. Manila, Philippines: International 
Rice Research Institute. 
Gregorio, G.B., D. Senadhira, H. Htut, and R.D. Graham. 2000. Breeding for trace 
mineral density in rice. Food and Nutrition Bulletin 21 (4):382-6. 
Haas, J.D., J.L. Beard, L.E. Murray-Kolb, A.M. del Mundo, A. Felix, and G.B. Gregorio. 
2005. Iron-Biofortified Rice Improves the Iron Stores of Non-anaemic Filipino 
Women. Community and International Nutrition:2823-30. 
Haas, P.M. 1992. Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination. International Organization. 46:1-35. 
HarvestPlus. 2004a. Breeding Crops for Better Nutrition: Harnessing Agricultural 
Technology to Improve Micronutrient Deficiencies. Washington DC: International 
Food Policy Research Institute. 
Hogg, D., 2000, Technological Change in Agriculture: Locking in to Genetic Uniformity, 
Macmillan Press (UK), St. Martin's Press (USA 
IFPRI. 2005. Proceedings of an International Dialogue on Pro-Poor Public-Private 
Partnerships for Food and Agriculture, 28-29 September 2005, at International 
Food Policy Research Institute: Washington DC. 
IRRI, Rockefeller Foundation, and Syngenta. 2001. International Rice Research Institute 
Begins Testing 'Golden Rice'. Basel. 
Jasanoff, S. 2005. "Let them eat cake”: GM Foods and the Democratic Imagination. In 
Science and Citizens:  Globalisation and the Challenge of Engagement, edited 
by M. Leach, I. Scoones and B. Wynne. London: Zed Books. 
19 
 
Kaul, I. 2008. Taking a Hint from Peers: Reform Ideas for CGIAR. Background Paper 
Prepared for the 2007/08 Independent Review Panel of the System of the 
Consultative Group on Agricultural Research (CGIAR). Berlin, Germany. 
Kryder, R.D., S.P. Kowalski, and A.F. Krattiger. 2000. The Intellectual and Technical 
Property Components of pro-Vitamin A Rice (Golden Rice): A Preliminary 
Freedom-To-Operate Review. Ithaca, New York: International Service for the 
Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA). 
Latour, B. 1987. Science in Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Nash, M. 2001. Grains of Hope. Time Magazine Monday 5th February 2001:38-46. 
Oasa, E. K. (1987) ‘The political economy of international agricultural research: A review 
of the CGIAR’s response to criticism of the Green Revolution’, in B. Glaeser (ed.) 
The Green Revolution Revisited: Critique and Alternatives, Allen and Unwin, 
London  
Perkins, J.H. 1997. Geopolitics and the Green Revolution: Wheat, Genes and the 
Cold War. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Potrykus, I. 2001. Golden Rice and Beyond. Plant Physiology 125:1157-1161. 
Rijsberman, F. 2002. CGIAR Challenge Programme on Water and Food: Business Plan: 
Discussion document for CP Water and Food Consortium Meeting on 13-14 June 
2002, Columbo. 
Saith, A. 2006. From Universal Values to Millennium Development Goals: Lost in 
Translation. Development and Change 37 (6):1167-1199. 
Sagasti, F. and Timmel, V. 2008. A Review of the CGIAR as a Provider of International 
Public Goods. System-Wide Review of CGIAR. Washington DC. 
Sandler, T. 2006. Regional Public Goods and Regional Cooperation. In Expert Paper 
Series Seven: Cross-Cutting Issues, edited by Secretariat of the International 
Task Force on Global Public Goods. Stockholm, Sweden. 
Science Council. 2006. Summary Report on System Priorities for CGIAR Research 
2005-2015. Rome: Science Council Secretariat, FAO. 
Science Council and CGIAR Secretariat. 2004. Synthesis of Lessons Learned from 
Initial Implementation of the CGIAR Pilot Challenge Programs. Washington DC: 
Science Council and CGIAR Secretariat. 
SCN. 2004b. Nutrition and the Millennium Development Goals. SCN News 28:11-14. 
Scoones, I. 2009. The politics of global assessments: the case of the International 
Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for 
20 
 
Development (IAASTD). Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3, July 2009, 
pp546-571. 
Secretariat of the International Task Force on Global Public Goods. 2006. Expert Paper 
Series Seven: Cross-Cutting Issues. Stockholm, Sweden. 
Stein, A.J., J.V. Meenakshi, M. Qaim, P. Nestel, H.P.S. Sachdev, and Z.A. Bhutta. 2005. 
Analysing the Health benefits of Biofortified Staple Crops by Means for the 
Disability-Adjusted Life Years Approach A Handbook Focusing on Iron, Zinc and 
Vitamin A. Vol. 4, HarvestPlus Technical Monographs. Washington DC and Cali: 
International Centre for Tropical Agriculture and International Food Policy 
Research Institute. 
Taverne, R. 2007. The real GM food scandal. Prospect 140:24-27. 
Toeniessen, G.H. 2000. Vitamin A Deficiency and Golden Rice: The Role of the 
Rockefeller Foundation. New York New York: Rockefeller Foundation. 
Toenniessen, G.H. 2002. Crop genetic improvement for enhanced human nutrition. J. 
Nutr. 132:2943S–2946S.  
von Braun, J., S. Fan, R. Meinzen-Dick, M.W. Rosegrant, and A. Nin Pratt. 2008. 
Agricultural Research for Food Security, Poverty Reduction and the Environment: 
What to Expect from Scaling Up CGIAR Investments and "Best Bet" 
Programmes. In IFPRI Issue Brief No 53. Washington DC: International Food 
Policy Research Institute. 
Welch, R. M., and R. D. Graham. 1999. A new paradigm for world agriculture: meeting 
human needs - productive, sustainable, nutritious. Field Crops Research 60:1-10. 
Ye, X., S. Al-Babili, A. Kloti, J. Zhang, P. Lucca, P. Beyer, and I. Potrykus. 2000. 
Engineering the Provitamin A (beta-carotene) Biosynthetic Pathway into 
(Caretenoid-Free) Rice Endosperm. Science 287:303-305. 
Zimmerman, R., and M. Qaim. 2004. Potential health benefits of Golden Rice: A 
Philippine case study. Food Policy 29:147-168. 
